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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the capital structure literature by 
investigating the determinants of capital structure of agricultural firms in 
Kenya, using annual data for the period 2010-2015. An empirical model to 
analyze the determinants was specified and estimated using both fixed and 
random effects estimation techniques. The estimation results provide 
evidence that profitability, liquidity, age and size of the firm are significant 
determinants of capital structure. Specifically, the results reveal a negative 
relationship between profitability and long term debt and a positive 
relationship between age of the firm and long term debt. We also established 
a positive influence of age on short term debt, while a negative link is 
evident between liquidity, the size of the firm and short term debt. The 
evidence adduced is important for forming credit markets policies for 
agricultural firms both at the macro and the micro level. 
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1. Introduction 
  Financial managers aim to develop an optimal capital structure that 
ensures profitability both for the shareholders and the firm (Hadlock, 2002). 
Financial managers may decide to change the capital structure composition 
without affecting the assets of the firm in a process referred to as capital 
restructuring (Brealey, et al., 2003). A company may opt to substitute one 
capital structure for the other, increase debt by issuing bonds and 
repurchasing stocks hence increasing the debt-equity ratio or issuing stock to 
raise funds to pay back the loans hence reducing the debt-equity ratio 
(Berger and Patti, 2006). This process involves a critical analysis of the 
sources of financing available and selection of an optimal mix that ensures 
the cost of capital is low and increases the firm value. 
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 The main objective of this study is to investigate the determinants of 
capital structure of agricultural firms in Kenya. Various studies have been 
conducted in Sub Sahara Africa on capital structure and financial 
performance but with conflicting conclusions. Using a panel data on all the 
listed firms at the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) over the time period 
2002-2011, Maina and Ishmail (2014) found that debt lowers firms' 
profitability. Abor (2005) analyzed the capital structures of different firm 
sizes and found that large firms have higher debt equity ratios. This is 
attributed to the debt tax shield that firms utilize to maximize their profits.  
 Several studies have arrived at inconclusive results with regard to the 
capital structure-profitability nexus. Using panel data to analyze 257 South 
African firms for the period 1998-2009, Sujay (2015) found a positive 
relationship between leverage and profitability. This is consistent with 
Fan,TitmanandTwite (2012) who established that for South African firms 
financial leverage affects financial performance positively. Empirical tests in 
the UK confirm predictions by the trade off and the pecking order theory 
whereby firms that are highly profitable with few investments pay a higher 
dividend to their shareholders (Fama and French, 2002).  
 There have also been concerns over the influence of liquidity on 
capital structure. Serghiescu and Vaidean (2014) for example conducted 
panel data regression analysis on 196 Romanian firms listed on the 
Bucharest Stock Exchange over the period 2003-2010 and established a 
negative relation between liquidity and capital structure. On the contrary, 
Sarlija and Harc (2012) using Pearson correlation coefficient on 1058 
Croatian small and medium size enterprises for the financial year 2009 to 
determine the covariance between liquidity and leverage found a negative 
relationship between liquidity and capital structure. Moreover, there was a 
stronger relationship between short term debt and leverage compared to long 
term debt and capital structure. The study by Gharaibeh (2014) on the 
relationship between capital structure, stock returns and liquidity of 15 firms 
listed in the Amman Stock Exchange for the period 2009-2012found a weak 
relationship between liquidity and capital structure of these firms. 
 Firm size has also featured prominently in the literature. Huang and 
Ritter (2009) for example used panel data regression analysis for 1200 listed 
firms in China for the period 1994-2003. The estimation results revealed a 
positive relationship between size and leverage. This finding supports 
Antoniou (2008) who also found a positive relationship between size of the 
firm and capital structure in U.K and U.S by using panel data and a two-step 
GMM estimation technique. Previous studies arriving at similar findings 
include Mazur (2007) using multiple regressions on Polish firms listed in the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange for the period of 2010-2014 and  Ozkan (2001) 
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who formulated a partial adjustment model and used the GMM estimation 
for 390 UK firms over the period of 1984–1996.  
 Another factor that has been analyzed extensively in the literature is 
firm's age. Using ordinary least squares on 28 listed agricultural firms in 
Nigeria for the period 2005-2010, Bassey (2014) found a positive 
relationship between firm’s age and leverage levels. This is consistent with 
Mac anBhaird (2010) who investigated the determinants of capital structure 
of 299 Irish small and medium enterprises using a generalization of 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR)and arrived at similar findings. 
Previous studies that had established a positive relationship include Abor 
(2005), Chen (2004), Bevan and Danbolt (2002), Hovakimian (2004) and 
Welch (2004). 
 These initial findings suggest that profitability, liquidity, age and size 
are the key determinants of firms' capital structure. There has however, been 
limited up-to-date scholarly work detailing the role of these factors on the 
capital structure of agricultural firms. This study seeks to bridge this gap.  
Even though the government of Kenya has formulated strategies to 
improve the agricultural industry in Kenya as documented by the Agriculture 
Sector Development Strategy (ASDS, 2010-2020), it is evident that 
agricultural firms still face unique challenges. These firms have all tried to 
overcome these hurdles through cost cutting strategies and capital 
restructuring methods such as increasing debt or issuing new stock to raise 
funds for future projects. Capital structure decisions have resulted in 
different outcomes for different firms.  
 While a few studies have analyzed the determinants of capital 
structure of listed firms at the NSE little has been done on the factors 
affecting the corporate capital structure decision of listed agricultural firms 
in Kenya. That which applies for the other sectors may not necessarily hold 
for the agriculture sector. Consistent with the research problem, the 
following pressing issue should receive more attention: What are the 
determinants of capital structure of agricultural firms in Kenya? 
 This study makes at least three contributions to the existing literature. 
First, it is timely, in view of the unresolved debate on the role of financing 
on firm’s performance. Second, understanding the key determinants of 
capital structure in agricultural firms will enable investors make informed 
decisions regarding wealth/portfolio maximization.  
 This paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the 
theoretical underpinnings. Section 3 describes the methodology which 
includes conceptual framework, empirical specifications, econometric 
approach, data and the measurements of our variables of interest.  In section 
4 we present the empirical results and discussions. Conclusions and policy 
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suggestions are offered in the final section by pointing out some unresolved 
issues. 
 
2. Theoretical underpinnings 
Modigliani and Miller Theorem. 
 Pagano (2003) argued that this approach was formulated in 1958 and 
it advocated for capital structure irrelevance in determining firm value. 
Miller and Modigliani observed that the firm's value was dependent on the 
operating profits and future prospects of growth for the firm.  High future 
growth prospects result in high market value and high share prices. Fan 
(2012) agreed that whether a firm decides to take up more debt and become a 
highly leveraged firm or whether it decides to have a lower debt component 
was completely irrelevant to the value of the firm. Bose (2010) observed that 
the  theory was based on the assumptions that: there were no taxes, the 
borrowing costs were same for both investors and companies, information 
was symmetrical both for the investors and the companies thus reducing the 
chances of agency costs and investors would be rational in the decision 
making process, transaction costs for selling and buying shares were 
nonexistent, debt financing did not affect the earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT) therefore the market value of the firm is not dependent on the 
capital structure policy adopted by the firm. 
 Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1961 and 1963) devised three 
propositions to support their capital structure irrelevance theory. The first 
proposition states that the capital structure composition does not affect firm 
value and increasing the debt proportion to finance the assets of the firm 
does not increase the firm's value. This proposition argued that both the 
creditors and shareholders have the same priority and income gained is 
divided equally among them. The second proposition states that as the firm 
increases leverage, shareholders perceive a higher risk and a higher return 
thus leading to an escalation in cost of equity. An escalation in the debt-
equity ratio leads to a hike in cost of capital. The third proposition stated the 
irrelevance of the dividend policy on the firm's market value. 
 In a world where corporate taxes are nonexistent, the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) remains unaffected by changes in leverage 
levels (Copeland, 1983). However, in the real world corporate taxes exist. In 
the existence of corporate taxes, WACC decreases as the firms increases 
leverage. As firms increase their leverage ratios, the cost of equity increases 
because this puts the shareholders at a higher risk of bankruptcy and little 
residual claims as a result of paying out retained earnings to creditors, as a 
result of this the shareholders require higher returns for the increased risk. 
On the other hand, increasing leverage enables a firm to gain through the tax 
deductibility of interest payments. This is a corporate tax shield which means 
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that taking up more debt reduces the tax payments by the firm. Alifani and 
Nugroho (2013) noted that firms prefer to have high debt proportions in their 
capital structure to benefit from the tax shield which ensures they pay fewer 
taxes than the unlevered firms hence increasing the value of the firm. 
However, how much debt a firm should take up to finance its projects still 
remains a complex decision of choosing the optimal leverage ratio for the 
firm. 
 Modigliani and Miller (1963) attempted to solve the leverage ratio 
puzzle by setting the marginal ratio to be equivalent of the average ratio 
which states that firms always set long run leverage targets. The market 
value or the net present value of the firm can therefore be determined 
subtracting the replacement value leverage from the reproduction value 
leverage. The replacement value leverage is the cost of financing the project 
through the purchases of plant, equipment and working capital while the 
reproduction value refers to the income expected from the project. According 
to M&M, for a marginal project, the reproduction and the replacement value 
leverage are equal and the net present value is zero. According to Villamil 
(2000) Modigliani and Miller’s third proposition states that the market value 
is unconstrained by the dividend policy. Whether a firm decides to pay 
higher dividends or no dividends at all, the firm's value will be unaffected by 
the dividend policy implemented by the firm. Stern and Chew (2003) argued 
that market values of firm are affected by the dividend policy and even 
though they acknowledged the work of Modigliani and Miller, they provided 
evidence that proves that movements in stock prices are affected by the 
capital structure decision and the dividend policies that firms implement. 
 Stiglitz (1969) disputed the assumptions under which the M&M 
theory was based on. He pointed out that it was impossible for corporates 
and individuals to borrow at the same market rate and bankruptcy costs do 
exist. Furthermore, taxes are existent and capital markets are imperfect. 
Assumptions should be close to reality and most of the assumptions in the 
M&M seem to be based in a control environment. In the real world 
individuals borrow at higher market rates than corporate organizations. 
 A jump in leverage ratios leads to a rise in earnings per share of stock 
and therefore DeMarzo (2007) disagreed with the M&M theory which 
specifies that the capital structure chosen does not change the firm's value. 
Brealey et al. (2013) analyzed the implications of implementing the M&M 
theorem and suggested that many financial firms collapsed during the global 
financial crisis in 2008 as a result of high leverage. Therefore, they disagreed 
with the theorem put forward by the M&M theorem which suggests that 
capital structure decision is irrelevant and firms can take up as much debt as 
possible without affecting the value of the firm. 
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Pecking Order Theory 
 Firms prefer internal financing and would rather use retained 
earnings to finance future projects before resorting to debt and finally equity 
(Myers and Majful 1984). They stated that when firms issue new equity, 
investors will devalue new equity issued since they believe that the new 
equity is overvalued. Firms will use internal funds then issue debt and when 
the firm exceeds the target leverage ratio they will issue new equity 
(Donaldson, 1961).   
 Abosede (2012) analyzed the assumptions put forward in the pecking 
order theory and added some assumptions which included: new shares must 
be issued to the public and not the insiders, information is asymmetrical 
between the shareholders and the firm's managers, cost of equity is much 
higher than the cost of incurring debt and managers have more knowledge on 
the value of the future projects. The cost of equity surpasses the cost of debt 
due to the probability of undervaluation by investors; therefore firms will opt 
to follow the pecking order. 
 Firms will shy away from issuing new equity and as a result they will 
pass out new investment opportunities to avoid the perception of 
overvaluation by investors. Fama and French (2002) agreed with these 
observations by Myers and Majful and stated that organizations with fewer 
investments pay higher dividends to their shareholders. This would make 
sense due to the fewer number of shareholders hence the cake is divided 
among fewer shareholders unlike a firm with a low debt-equity ratio.  
 The hierarchy of financial decision making policy is highly 
dependent on transaction costs (Baskin 1989). Firms will opt to follow the 
option that has the lowest costs in order to maximize profits. He analyzed the 
USA markets and concluded that the cost of incurring debt was much lower 
in those markets than the cost of equity, thus they follow the pecking order. 
 Huang and Ritter (2009) found out that managers want to be in 
control of the decision making process and will avoid the equity option 
because they will lose grip of financial policy formulation in the firm. The 
higher the number of shareholders in the firm, the lower the power they have 
over the decision making process. High leverage ratios and number of 
shareholders restricts the managerial power of financial directors, they are 
constrained by both the shareholders and suppliers demands and are unable 
to make financial decisions fast without facing bottlenecks in the process. 
 Managers will minimize restrictions on their financial control by 
using internal funds to finance investment projects first and will only 
proceed to source for external funds once retained earnings are inadequate to 
fund future projects (Lace and Bistrova, 2011). They will seek short term 
loans which have minimal restrictions and do not require collateral and if 
they still need more funds they will proceed to take up long term debt 
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(Hamilton and Fox, 1998). The last option is equity financing, after all 
retained earnings and short and long term debt have all been used up, thus 
following the pecking order theory. 
 Short term debt reduces the risk to shareholders and increases the 
stock value if the covariance between net operating income and the expected 
future interest is positive. Firms will take up short term debt to finance future 
projects which are profitable and ensure that they pay back the debt and still 
have enough profit to distribute to the shareholders and fund future projects 
(Morris 1976) 
 Financial managers follow the pecking order theory to maintain 
status quo and confidence in the shareholders (Meier and Tarhan (2007). 
This implies that managers are in full control of funds and the decision 
making process and are not constrained by conditions from suppliers and 
creditors. It also ensures that the agents or managers perform efficiently by 
utilizing internal financing well and maximizing the wealth of the 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Once a business issues equity, 
investors discount the value of the stocks and conclude that they are 
mispriced and overvalued; they perceive the firm value to be low since 
equity is seen as the last resort to financing of firm projects (Frank and Goyal 
2007). Moreover, if firms are unable to raise funds from internal financing 
and debt, they will issue common stocks first before issuing preference 
shares to the public. Preferred shareholders are paid out first before the 
common shareholders once a firm becomes insolvent and must liquidate, 
they also demand a fixed level of return whether the financial performance is 
high or low (Warfield, 2007). Therefore, firms will avoid issuing preference 
shares due to the high cost of this type of equity. 
 Hijaziand Tariq (2006) outlined the limitations of the pecking order 
theory by pointing out that it ignores the effects of agency costs and effects 
of accumulating too much retained earnings, if financial managers are too 
keen to follow the pecking order theory, they may avoid investing retained 
earnings on present investment opportunities to keep the funds for future 
projects to avoid borrowing in the future and as a result losing out on new 
and lucrative investment opportunities.  
 
Trade off Theory 
 The M&M theory had certain limitations since it indicated the 
importance of leverage through the tax debt shield effect. However, this 
supports the notion that a firm can be fully financed through debt and this 
can lead to bankruptcy if the managers embezzle the funds in the firm. 
Financial controllers must analyze the cost and gains associated with 
leverage. Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) argued that optimal leverage ratio 
indicates the balance between the bankruptcy costs and tax benefits of 
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accrued debt. Firms use this balancing technique to set a target debt-equity 
ratio and works towards reaching that target (Myers, 1984). Frank and Goyal 
(2004) supported that firms set a target leverage ratio and formulate policies 
and investment decisions that ensure the firm operates within the set target to 
avoid financial distress. 
 Financial distress is a combination of both the bankruptcy and non-
bankruptcy costs (Bevan and Danbolt, 2000). Suppliers of debt or the 
creditors may impose disadvantageous terms of payment such as a short 
payback period or high interest rates on the loan; as a result this may choke 
the activities and decision making process of the firm (Chen, 2004). Other 
costs of debt include a high staff attrition rate when the staffs predict that the 
firm may be unable to pay back the debt and fulfill their financial 
obligations, or infighting between the shareholders and the decision makers 
of the firm as a result of increasing the leverage in the firm. 
 According to Copeland (1983) the gain from leverage is the 
difference between the value of the levered and the unlevered firm. This is 
the product of the corporate tax and the market value of debt. Firms must do 
a cost benefit analysis of debt and ensure that the debt is profitable and adds 
value to the firm. If the managers misuse the funds, then the gain of leverage 
may be eroded. He further suggested that the optimal capital structure can be 
achieved by considering the debt-equity ratio and the maturity of debt. 
Financial practitioners must consider both the amount and the maturity of 
debt in order to realize its true value and impact on the firm value (Miller, 
1977). The mix of long term and short term debt is extremely crucial in 
determining the benefit of leverage.  
 Businesses may decide to sell back securities in order to reach their 
set target ratio rather than just formulating a financial policy (Leary and 
Roberts 2005). Firms may issue securities to the market, however, this may 
lead to the misconception by investors that the shares are mispriced or 
overvalued (Adedeji, 1998). Therefore, many financial managers may shy 
off from issuing new stock as a result. 
 The benefits of debt are difficult to realize if one considered the non-
debt tax shields and personal taxes (Miller (1977). As much as firms are 
ready to inject more debt to benefit from the tax shield, they cannot ignore 
the presence of non-debt tax. Non debt tax shields including depreciation and 
tax credits cannot be avoided by firms and this poses a challenge in 
analyzing the benefit of debt.                 
 The tradeoff theory can be further be broken down into: The static 
trade off theory and the dynamic trade off theory. The static trade off theory 
applies to firms that set the target leverage ratio during a single period of 
time while the dynamic theory is followed by firms which set a target 
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leverage ratio and constantly adjust the target and correct deviations from the 
target (Bradley (1984). 
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) disputed the idea of a single period 
model and argued that firms operate in many periods and following the static 
model would eliminate retained earnings which exist in the real world. They 
observed firms set a target leverage ratio and constantly adjust its financing 
and operation by considering expected future stream of cash flows thus 
supporting the application of the dynamic trade off theory in the real world. 
Hennesy and Whited (2005) formulated the dynamic trade off theory to solve 
the shortcomings that were evident in the static model. The firm faces two 
major decisions relating to the amount they need for the investment and 
sources of funding whether internal, debt or equity. Managers will make the 
capital structure decision by analyzing future values of the project and their 
profitability. They concluded that there is no target level ratio but rather it 
changes with financial needs of the firm. 
 According to Rajan and Zingales (2005), the target leverage is not 
really important and highly profitable firms tend to borrow less. This is a 
contradiction with the earlier predictions by Meyer, since firms are expected 
to borrow more to take advantage of the tax debt shield. Microsoft is a good 
example of firms which are highly profitable but still have zero debt (Agha 
et al, 2014). Graham and Harvey (2001) surveyed various corporate 
executives and they did not show much interest in debt. They preferred to 
use retained earnings instead of debt despite the benefit of the tax shield 
effect.  
 
Market Timing Theory  
 Baker and Wurgler (2002) noted that the pecking order focused on 
the optimal capital hierarchy while the tradeoff theory only focused on the 
leverage ratio that cushion firms from financial distress. They argue that both 
theories avoid addressing the important factor of timing that is the optimal 
time to make the capital structure decision and issue new stocks to the 
market. They developed the market timing theory with an aim of determining 
the optimal market timing to issue new stocks to the market. The market 
timing theory is founded on the assumptions that asymmetric information 
may vary in the stock market and management trusts the application of the 
market timing strategy of the stock market (Welch, 2004). 
 Managers are able to note the time when it is less costly to issue 
equity due to the high valuation of the company’s stock (Lemmon et al. 
(2005). Managers issue new stock when the market valuation of the firm is 
high which leads to low cost of equity, thus increasing the wealth of present 
shareholders (Adedeji, 1998). Firms issue shares when the market value rises 
above the past market values, they issue new stock when the share prices are 
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relatively high (Lucas and McDonald, 1991). The market timing of stock 
issue decision made by a firm has long term effects on capital structure 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2002). They declare that once a firm decided to 
implement a certain policy regarding the market timing of stock issue; it 
would affect the capital structure for a long period of time. Hovakimian 
(2004) agreed that managers issue new stock when the share prices are high, 
however, he disagreed that the equity market timing policy adopted by affirm 
had long term effects but rather the equity market timing effect on the capital 
structure disappeared within two years (Huang and Ritter, 2004). Firms issue 
new stock when the market is well informed of the company and its growth 
potential (Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1991). Thus firms should 
provide accurate information about the company before issuing new stock to 
avoid adverse selection and moral hazard events in the firm. 
 Financial managers prefer to take short term debt when they expect 
that the long term interest rates will fall (Bancel and Mittoo, 2004). 
Managers who follow this decision making process are using the forward 
looking timing whereby they expect the long term debt interest rates to fall in 
the future so they can take them but in the meanwhile they take up short term 
debt to finance their projects as they await the future fall in the long term 
debt (Graham and Harvey (2001). 
 The market timing theory states that an equity offering will follow a 
period of high financial performance and positive returns (Lucas and 
McDonald, 1990). This is due to the attractiveness of the firm’s 
performances and probability of stock prices going higher as a result of 
continued high financial performance. Financial managers time the market 
and issue new stock at its peak performance, however after the initial public 
offering, stock prices tend to fall after some time. They concluded that 
optimal capital structure doesn't exist because the debt equity ratio changes 
when managers employ the market timing strategy. Welch (2014), through 
the managerial inertia theory observed that managers usually let the capital 
structure adjust with share prices changes. 
  
3. Methodology 
3.1 Conceptual framework 
 Miller and Modigliani (1958) observed that the firm's value was 
dependent on the operating profits and future prospects of growth for the 
firm.  High future growth prospects results in high market value and high 
share prices. Myers and Majful (1984) argued that firms prefer internal 
financing and would rather use retained earnings to finance future projects 
before resorting to debt and finally equity. They stated that when firms issue 
new equity, investors will devalue new equity issued since they believe that 
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the new equity is overvalued. The main focus of trade off theory is on the 
leverage ratios that cushion firms from financial distress.  
 
Profitability 
 Titman and Wessels (1988) suggested that firms with high earnings 
before interest and taxes will use retained earnings in form of profits to fund 
future projects and avoid debt intake thus maintaining low debt ratios. On the 
other hand, Scherrand and Hulburt (2001) found evidence of a positive 
correlation between capital structure and profitability of firms, thus implying 
that highly profitable firms have high debt ratios. This study therefore 
predicts a positive relationship between profitability and capital structure.  
 
Liquidity 
 Firms which are highly liquid have high working capital, can 
generate more profits for the firm and therefore reduce the need of debt 
(Chen, 2004). Empirical evidence shows a negative correlation between 
liquidity and capital structure (Sarlija and Harc 2012). We therefore predict a 
negative impact on capital structure. 
 
Age of the firm 
 Firms that have been operating for many years are attractive clients to 
banks and creditors. The age of the firm increases the reputation and 
creditworthiness of a firm. Thus creditors could use the reputation a firm has 
built over its years in operations to determine the ability of the firm to fulfill 
its financial obligations (Diamond 1989). Older firms tend to take up more 
debt and have high debt ratios compared to new firms which have existed in 
the market for a shorter period of time and are unable to prove the history of 
their ability to fulfill their financial obligations to creditors. Therefore, we 
predict a positive relationship between age and capital structure. 
 
Size of the firm 
 Smaller firms avoid taking up debt to finance their operations while 
larger firms tend to have an appetite for debt to finance future projects due to 
the tax income deductibility of debt as an expense and easier access to credit 
compared to smaller firms(Castanias 1983). Smaller firms take up less debt 
to avoid bankruptcy costs associated with increase in debt. Lenders are also 
cautious when advancing credit to smaller firms due to agency costs which 
might arise as a result of minimal supervision and regulation of financial 
decisions implemented by managers of the borrowing firms (Titman and 
Wessels 1988).  Friend and Lang (1988) observed a positive relationship 
between firm size and capital structure. On the contrary, Cassar and Holmes 
(2003) found a negative relationship between size and short term debt which 
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implies that small firms go for short term debt to cater for operational costs 
while large firms take up long term debt to finance long term projects. We 
therefore predict an indeterminate relationship between size and capital 
structure. The conceptual framework is based on the existing literature as 
follows; 
 
Exogenous variables     Endogenous variables
 
 
3.2 Model specification 
 Consistent with the conceptual framework, the empirical 
specification seeks to explain the determinants of capital structure in the 
agriculture industry. For the purpose of estimation, two general linear models 
are specified as follows: 
𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.........(1) 
𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡........ (2) 
Where 𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡and 𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡represents the endogenous variables long and 
short term debt ratios respectively for the ith firm at tth period. 𝛽0is the 
intercept term, the subscripts i and t index firm and time respectively. In 
addition, the specification also contains an unobservable firm-specific effect  
µ and the usual stochastic disturbance error-term ε following normal 
distribution with mean 0 and variance 𝜎2. 
𝛽𝑖is the slope coefficients where i = 1...4   
ROEit is the profitability of firm i for time period t proxied by return on 
equity (ROE).  
LIQit is the liquidity of firm i for time period t.  
AGEit is the age of firm i for time period t.  
SIZit is the size of firm i for time period t.  
 
3.3 Econometric approach 
 The study employed the panel regression model to estimate the 
determinants of capital structure of agricultural firms in Kenya. Panel data 
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combines the cross sectional data or the firm specific effects and the time 
series data which is the data varying in different time periods. The panel 
regression model of estimation ensures that omitted variables are controlled 
thus reducing the chances of biased estimates.  
 There might be instances of heteroskedasticity due to the difference 
in variance of the estimates in different time periods. To address this issue, 
the Breusch–Pagan test was conducted to test the presence of 
heteroskedasticity in the residual variance. A Langrage multiplier statistic 
was then calculated and compared with the critical chi-square value ᵡ20.005, 
10=25.182; any values above this level indicated presence of 
heteroskedasticity. In the presence of heteroskedasticity, the Eicker-Huber-
White standard errors were used to control heteroskedasticity and obtain 
homoskedastic estimates. 
 The choice between a fixed and a random effect model was 
determined by conducting the Hausman test. Random effect model is most 
suitable for data where the instrumental variables are assumed to be random 
while the fixed effects model assumes fixed variables across all data thus 
controlling for omitted variables; it is thus the best model to use for data with 
unobservable factors which remain unaffected by time. The fixed effect 
model however, faces the challenge of being unable to estimate within-group 
variation which may exist in the specific variables and time invariant 
variables. 
 Previous studies that have used the fixed effects model to determine 
factors affecting capital structure include: Abor (2005), Aulova and Hlavsa 
(2013), Bassey et al. (2014), Muriu (2016). This study also used the Fischer 
test to test for panel unit root. The Fischer test is commonly used to analyze 
the non-random relationship between two variables and its p-values are 
accurate for all data size samples whether large or small whereas the chi-
square test results may be inaccurate for small data size samples hence the 
need to conduct both tests. 
 
3.4 Dataset and measurement of variables 
 This study used annual company data for the period 2010-2015 for 
listed agricultural firms. The company data was collected from audited 
financial reports of individual companies, Nairobi Securities Exchange 
(NSE) quarterly and annual reports and the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) 
database. 
 Profitability is a crucial indicator of the capital structure decision a 
firm decides to implement. The profitability of the firm is measured by the 
return on assets of the firm (ROA) and the return on equity of the firm 
(ROE).  
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 Bevan and Danbolt (2002) identified liquidity as the ease of 
converting assets into cash. The higher the cash flow in a firm, the more 
liquid it is. The firm’s liquidity was measured using the current ratio by 
dividing current assets by current liabilities.  
 The age of the firm refers to the number of years that the firm has 
been in operation. This was measured by taking the number of years in 
operation. Large firms have more assets than small firms. Consistent with 
Harford, Mansi and Maxwell (2008), firm size is measured by taking the 
natural log of total assets.Capital structure is the debt and equity mix 
implemented by firms to finance operations. This was measured by long term 
and short term debt ratios. 
 
4. Empirical results and discussions 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 4.1 shows that agricultural firms in Kenya have higher 
proportions of long term debt financing (19.98%) compared to short term 
debt financing (9.16%) in their capital structure composition, suggesting that 
these firms aim to benefit from the tax shield. The positive values of the 
capital structure indicates that these companies are in a good position to 
honour their financial obligations when due.  
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of variables 
 LTD STD ROA ROE LIQ AGE SIZ 
Mean 0.1998 0.0916 8.9302 13.8733 5.2645 97.3571 6.3186 
Median 0.2096 0.0755 6.55 12.5 4.56 87.5 6.415 
Maximum 0.2472 0.276 61.57 85.39 18.3 146 7.21 
Minimum 0.0534 0.008 -11.9 -14.7 1.3 58 5.2 
Std. Dev. 0.04063 0.0655 12.4533 16.89 3.7854 32.7726 0.567 
Skewness -1.5432 1.2379 2.0530 1.9329 1.7257 0.4346 -0.4099 
Kurtosis 5.7106 3.7662 9.4363 9.2671 6.3327 1.5968 1.9968 
Jarque-
Bera 
15.91 9.80 24.96 23.85 18.39 16.34 5.38 
Probability 0.2034 0.715 0.167 0.217 0.719 0.3366 0.089 
Sum 8.3922 3.848 375.07 582.68 221.11 4089 265.38 
Obs 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
 
 The mean profitability of the firms measured by the return of assets 
stands at 8.93% while the average return on equity is 13.87% indicating a 
positive return on investment for investors in this sector, hence making 
agricultural stocks relatively attractive to potential investors. Even though 
the mean liquidity ratio (5.2:1) is higher than the recommended value of 2:1, 
signaling positive cash flow available for expansion of product line and 
increasing inventory, it indicates that these firms are not taking full 
advantage of investment opportunities in the short run. The average age of 
agricultural listed firms in Kenya is 97.36 years suggesting only companies 
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older than 58 years are listed in NSE raising an alarm on why new firms 
have not been able to list their stocks in the NSE. The same scenario applies 
to the size of the firm, with most quoted firms recording large assets base. 
 The long term debt and firm size have negative skewness 
values. The short term debt, return on assets, return on equity, liquidity and 
the age of the firm have positive skewness values. The Jarque-Bera test of 
normality was conducted and the critical t value (2.490) obtained was below 
the chi2 value of 22.78, thus indicating the data is normally distributed. 
 
4.2 Correlation analysis 
 Table 4.2 shows that return on assets and return on equity are 
highly correlated since they both capture the profitability of the firm. The 
results also indicate that liquidity is negatively correlated to short term debt, 
implying that firms with free cash flow avoid short term debt. A positive 
correlation between short term debt, age and the size of the firm implies that 
large firms which have been operating for a long period of time will have a 
large appetite for short term debt.  
 The correlation matrix also shows a negative correlation 
between liquidity and long term debt implying that highly liquid firms will 
avoid long term debt and instead opt for retained earnings which is consistent 
with pecking order theory. The results also indicate a positive correlation 
between long term debt, return on assets, return on equity, age of the firm 
and the size of the firm. This implies that older firms are also larger and rely 
more on long term debt. 
Table 4.2 Correlation matrix 
 LTD STD ROA ROE LIQ AGE SIZ 
LTD 1.0000       
STD 0.3902 1.0000      
ROA 0.2098 0.0927 1.0000     
ROE 0.2492 0.1389 0.9721 1.0000    
LIQ -0.1384 -0.5892 0.2173 0.1629 1.0000   
AGE 0.4638 0.3244 0.0014 0.0426 -0.0696 1.0000  
SIZ 0.0854 0.0328 -0.2764 -0.2444 -0.5267 0.2062 1.0000 
 
4.3 Panel unit root tests 
 Table 4.3 shows the unit root test. The Fisher-type test, based on the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test was conducted to test for stationarity of the 
data. The p-values obtained from the test were less than 0.05 hence we 
rejected the null hypothesis which states that all the panels contain unit root. 
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Table 4.3: Fisher panel unit root test 
 Statistic p-value 
Inverse chi-squared 
(14) 
P 32.7523 0.0031 
Inverse normal Z -2.9831 0.0014 
Inverse logit (39) L* -3.0582 0.0020 
Modified inv chi-
squared 
Pm 3.5438 0.0002 
P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
 
4.4 Hausman test 
The Hausman test is used in panel data to ascertain the most appropriate 
model. This  test was conducted on both the long term and the short term 
debt models and the results reported in Table 4.4. The p-value obtained from 
the long term debt Hausman test (0.0143) was significant, therefore the fixed 
effects model was the most appropriate model. 
Table 4.4: Hausman test for long term debt 
 (b) 
Fixed 
(B) 
Random 
(b-B) 
Difference 
sqrt (diag(v_b-
v_B)) 
S.E 
ROA 0.0324 0.0033 0.0292 0.02635 
ROE 0.0029 0.0035 0.0324 0.02070 
LIQ 0.0119 0.1421 0.0230 0.01411 
AGE 0.0166 0.0070 0.1733 0.0756 
SIZ 0.0258 0.5002 0.7578 0.1083 
Test : Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
Chi2(5) = (b-B)’[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 14.21 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0143 
 The Hausman test was also conducted on the short term debt 
model and the results reported in Table 4.5. The p-value obtained from the 
test (0.2481) was insignificant but greater than 0.05. A random effect model 
was therefore chosen as the most appropriate model to estimate the short 
term debt model. 
Table 4.5 Hausman test for short term debt 
 (b) 
Fixed 
(B) 
Random 
(b-B) 
Difference 
sqrt (diag(v_b-
v_B)) 
S.E 
ROA 0.0324 0.0033 0.0292 0.02635 
ROE 0.0029 0.0035 0.0324 0.02070 
LIQ 0.0119 0.1421 0.0230 0.01411 
AGE 0.0166 0.0070 0.1733 0.0756 
SIZ 0.0258 0.5002 0.7578 0.1083 
Test : Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
Chi2(5) = (b-B)’[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 6.65 
Prob>chi2 = 0.2481 
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4.5 Estimation results 
 Panel regression analysis was conducted on both long and 
short term debt to test the significance of the independent variables on the 
capital structure of the firm. Table 4.6 reports the estimation results from 
equations (1 and 2). The estimated models fit the panel data reasonably well, 
having fairly stable coefficients. Further, the overall test statistic of the 
Wald-test shows rejection of the hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to 
zero. Interesting results emerge in both significant and non-significant 
findings.  
Table 4.6: Estimation results of short term and long term debt 
Variant model specifications with robust standard errors 
 Fixed Effects Model Random  Effects Model 
Variable Notation      LTD     STD 
 
Intercept 
 1.8449 
(1.04) 
0.4061 
(4.08) 
 
Return on Assets 
ROA 0.0043 
(-0.17) 
0.0003 
(0.13) 
 
Return on Equity 
ROE -0.0036* 
(0.39) 
0.0003 
(0.20) 
 
Liquidity 
LIQ -0.0024 
(0.74) 
-0.0142*** 
(-6.49) 
 
Age of the firm 
AGE 0.0145** 
(1.37) 
0.0007*** 
(3.23) 
 
Size of the firm 
SIZ -0.0371 
(0.87) 
-0.0500*** 
(-3.36) 
Number of observations  36 42 
 
R - Squared: 
 
 Within = 0.4466                            
Between = 0.3899 
Overall = 0.1883 
Within = 0.4729                         
Between= 0.842 
Overall= 0.6023 
F- test/ Wald Chi test  F (5, 24) = 3.87 Wald Chi2(5) = 54.52 
Prob> F/ Prob>chi2  0.0103 0.0000 
 
 Table 4.6 represents regression results of determinants of both long 
term and short term debt of agricultural firms in Kenya. Estimation for long 
term debt was done using fixed effects while the short term debt was 
conducted using random effects. The t-statistics are represented in 
parentheses while *, **, *** represents the significant levels at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. 
 Both the long and short term debt regressions results shows a positive 
and significant relationship between age of the firm and leverage. These 
results are consistent with Frank and Goyal (2004), Hovakimian (2004), and 
Mang’unyi (2011). This is perhaps because firms that have been operational 
for a long period of time and have either enhanced relationship lending, or 
may be able to make use of assets acquired over time to serve as collateral 
for credit.  
 The proxies for financial performance or profitability in this study are 
return on assets and return on equity. Estimation results indicates that there is 
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a negative relationship between return on equity and capital structure. 
Previous studies that have arrived at the same findings include Fama and 
French (2002), Maina (2014) and Kariuki and Kamau (2010). This implies 
that the the firms may be ploughing back profits which reduces leverage 
levels. Firms that record high profits are able to easily fund current and 
future short term projects. Highly profitable firms are able to maintain low 
debt levels by avoiding taking up new debt which is an additional cost for the 
firm but instead they use the retained earnings. 
 The short term regression results illustrate that liquidity, and size 
were significant determinants of short term debt. The  negative association 
observed between short term debt, liquidity and size of the firm supports 
Fama and French (2002), Marsh (1982) and Sujay (2015) findings.  
 The negative link between short term debt and liquidity could be as a 
result of available cash flow to fund short term operations before resorting to 
short term debt which is consistent with the pecking order theory and Chen 
(2004) findings. Highly liquid firms are able to generate high profits 
therefore reducing the appetite for debt.  
 The estimation results also establish a negative relationship between 
leverage and size of the firm. These results are consistent with Castanias 
(1983), Lang (1988) and Titman and Wessels (1988) who noted that smaller 
firms avoid debt due to being risk averse and fear of falling into bankruptcy. 
Intuitively, larger firms are able to take up more debt due to the tax 
deductibility of income as an expense.         
 
5. Conclusion 
 The main aim of this study was to investigate the determinants of 
capital structure of agricultural firms in Kenya. The study used annual 
company data of listed agricultural firms for the period 2010-2015. An 
empirical model to analyze the impact of profitability, liquidity, age of the 
firm and size of the firm on the capital structure of listed agricultural firms in 
Kenya was specified and estimated using both fixed and random effects 
estimation techniques.  
 The estimation results reveals a negative relationship between 
profitability and long term debt and a positive relationship between age of 
the firm and long term debt. An analysis of the determinants of short term 
debt indicates that there exists a positive influence of age on debt, while a 
negative link between liquidity, the size of the firm and short term debt is 
established. 
 The negative influence of size on debt implies that as agricultural 
firms become larger, the weight of debt financing steadily decreases while 
equity becomes a more important source of finance.Age of the firm has 
similar implications due to reputation effects. Older firms are therefore able 
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to borrow more. The negative influence of liquidity on capital structure 
implies that firms with positive cash flow can easily finance short term 
operations and investments without the need of taking up short term debt. 
Firms should reduce their high liquidity ratios and undertake more short term 
investments, such as treasury bills or commercial papers, which may ensure 
that their liquidity is not compromised. 
 The negative relationship between profitability and leverage implies 
that agricultural firms in Kenya follow the pecking order theory.  Firms 
could be avoiding higher debt uptake to avoid financial distress associated 
with bankruptcy costs. Therefore, financial managers should be vigilant 
before they increase their leverage ratios as this might reduce investments to 
current and prospective shareholders. 
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